Play Store: Google adds an offer tab offering good deals on apps and games

This stems in particular from the description of the effect of the demotion of competing offers by Google on their traffic. The degradation generates loss of advertising revenue, loss of income drawn from the commissions paid by traders, as well as the reduction in the capacity to benefit from network effects, which reduce the capacity to access user data, which in return reduces the relevance of the tool. By qualifying the Google infrastructure search engine, in all the singularity of a digital infrastructure, the court opens the way to taking into account anti -competitive effects within a user ecosystem.

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Play Store: Google adds an offer tab offering good deals on apps and games

Google has just added a new “Offers” tab on its play store. It allows users to access good deals on applications and mobile games available in the Android catalog.

Since Thursday, the Mountain View firm offers a new tab on its application catalog, for some users. Called ” Offers” , it gathers All good deals on a single interface, to allow users to have more easily access to it.

A rain of good deals on the Play Store

In its blog post this Thursday, January 27, Google indicates that the tab will highlight promotions on games and objectable objects in games, rewards, but also group offers, discounts on books and films , and the apps offering free trials. As you can see, this new Offers tab will include a string of good deals So that holders of an Android smartphone can enjoy apps and games at advantageous prices. This new tab is placed at the bottom of the screen, and Google promises to add new tips every day.

The Mountain View firm indicates that the new tab will be available at “More users in the United States, India and Indonesia in the coming weeks, and users of other countries later in 2022”. It will therefore be necessary to be patient before enjoying this new tab in France.

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  Google Shopping: the Union court rings the death knell for an era of excess digital

  The European Union court on November 10, 2021, one of the most structuring decisions of our time in the so -called case Google Shopping. Beyond the fact that this is the first decision by which the voice of the judges of the Union is fully heard on the new forms of abusive behavior observable in the digital economy, the judgment is a depth, exceptional modernity and wealth both on the substance of competition law, and from the point of view of general community law and procedural technique.

  by Fayrouze Masmi-Dazi, associate lawyer, Frieh associated on November 22, 2021

  

  Four years after the decision of the Commission and to constant law, the European Union court paid the way to the apprehension by the competition law of generalized practices of a new order, implemented by a limited number of ‘Structuring actors, by adopting a classic and eminently current look.

  In a decision of June 27, 2017, the European Commission had ordered Google to a pecuniary sanction of a record amount of 2.4 billion euros, including 523 million euros jointly with Alphabet, his parent company, for having abused, In thirteen countries of the European Economic Area (EEE), its dominant position on the general research market on the Internet.

  The Commission had indeed considered that Google positioned and highlighted its product comparator on its general results pages more favorable than for competing operators, that a significant traffic was however essential for product comparators and that behavior De Google led to increasing traffic to its own comparator, thereby reducing that of competing comparators.

  In support of their appeal, Google and Alphabet have focused their arguments on the challenge of the existence of an abuse (not of its dominant position) and the sanction inflicted. In essence, Google argued that what the Commission considered abusive practices was qualitative improvements to its Internet research service and that the Commission demanded from Google an obligation to provide access to its research without research results demonstrate that the criteria of an essential ease in the sense of case law Brush (CJCE 26 Nov. 1998, AFF. C-7/97, ​​D. 1999. 24 ; RTD Com. 1999. 798, obs. S. Poillot-Peruzzetto ; RTD EUR. 1999. 271, chron. J.-B. Blaise and L. Idot ) were actually filled.

  Giving one by one the means raised by Google, the Tribunal methodically sets the foundations of a real reference framework for the application of competition law to these singular practices – including structuring operators of the digital economy S ‘ Apose fresses – implemented under variable pretexts that the court ostensibly dismisses both in terms of the characterization of the offense as well as their alleged justification.

  This is how the court rings the end of a game and the entry into a new era where European competition authorities are both reinforced in their action, secured in the capacity of competition law to capture these New kinds of offenses and where companies operating in giant ecosystems are heard in the materiality of the troubles they undergo. We bet that future-national and European decisions-may be more quickly and surely adopted.

  An abuse of two slopes: concomitant combination of a self -promotion mechanism and demarcation of competing offers

  One of the fundamental contributions of this decision lies in the qualification of the practice of abuse in its singularity. While recalling that the dominant position is not problematic in itself when it is won over by merits and that the use of leverage to expand on other markets is not more problematic in itself, The court claims that the abuse in question does not only deal with the self -promotion by Google of its services only the latter presents as a qualitative improvement, but to the concomitant downside of the offers of its competitors.

  The judgment also underlines the “two weights, two measures” in the argument of Google which, on the one hand, claims qualitative improvements in the promotion of its products but, on the other, does not Of course not retains such a qualification for the demotion of competing products. In any event, it is clearly recalled that the question of taking into account qualitative improvements can only arise at the stage of possible objective justifications and any efficiency gains that Google fails to demonstrate, in particular regard to the degradation of the competing offer.

  This qualification is particularly enlightening as part of the analysis of structuring operators’ practices in the digital economy. If the list of abusive practices is not limiting in article 102 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) – which the court reaffirms brilliantly – is the first time that the combination of two slopes of behavior is qualified as such, in the digital economy. The characterization of an abuse of combining the promotion of its own services and downgrading those of its competitors through leverage via A digital infrastructure allowing to connect service providers with end users is not without echoing other practices currently under instructions around the world.

  The scope of the reports of the court in this regard is indeed much higher than the context of the only dispute in the presence. The challenge of this qualification is crucial while the European Commission and National Competition Authorities instruct many complaints relating to this type of practices and at a time when European deputies analyze and have digital regulation projects (Digital Markets Act [DMA], V. Dalloz News, Jan 8. 2021, obs. VS. Crichton and Digital Services Act (DSA), Dalloz News, Jan. 8. 2021, obs. VS. Crichton).

  In addition, the court, validating the approach of the commission, considers that the disruptive effect of this abusive behavior on the functioning of the market must be appreciated in the light of three specific criteria:

  1. The importance of traffic generated by Google’s general search engine which is the most important asset of the specialized search engine. Traffic makes it possible to increase the relevance of the results, generates income either by commissions paid by merchants, or advertising revenues and, above all, it provides information and data on users, which makes it possible to improve relevance and The usefulness of results. Traffic also allows network effects capable of generating additional income;

  2. user behavior when searches on the engine. The favoritism set up by Google has led to making its offers more visible and less visible those of competitors, which was likely to influence the behavior of Internet users. The latter tend to assume that the first results are the most relevant;

  3. The fact that the diverted traffic from the general results pages of Google has a large proportion of traffic to competing products comparators and cannot actually be replaced by other sources.

  These criteria are reminiscent of those that French law uses to characterize the abuse of economic dependence. Some had also pointed out in 2017 that community case law does not fully ignore this concept to have already implemented it, hitherto limited to exploitation abuses by companies holding exclusive rights (p. Bougette, o. Budzinski and F. M.A arty, Exploitation Abuse and Abuse of Economic Dependence: What Can We Learn from the Industrial Organization Approach, Political economy review, theft. 129, n ° 2, 2019, p. 261-286). The court makes, it seems, one more step in this direction.

  An online search engine is an infrastructure-what is a search engine if not an online intermediation platform ?

  In its decision, the court qualifies the Google infrastructure search engine. More precisely, the infrastructure in question consists in the general result pages of Google which generate traffic to other websites, in particular those of competing products comparators. It is thus distinguished from other infrastructures referred to in case law and made up of bodily or intangible assets, having in particular with regard to its open character.

  This qualification is far from harmless in a context of future regulation since it establishes the base with constant law. It has a much more systemic scope because the Google infrastructure thus defined is none other than an intermediation platform allowing operators to promote and offer content, products or online services from end users and Interact with the ecosystem of operators allowing the distribution of these content, products or online services, in particular advertisers and adtechs.

  This stems in particular from the description of the effect of the demotion of competing offers by Google on their traffic. The degradation generates loss of advertising revenue, loss of income drawn from the commissions paid by traders, as well as the reduction in the capacity to benefit from network effects, which reduce the capacity to access user data, which in return reduces the relevance of the tool. By qualifying the Google infrastructure search engine, in all the singularity of a digital infrastructure, the court opens the way to taking into account anti -competitive effects within a user ecosystem.

  This definition adopted by the European Union court also enters the anchoring of the commission proposal in the draft settlement and guidelines on vertical restrictions in constant law. This revised rules project indeed considers online intermediation service platforms such as Google’s search engine, such as suppliers providing distributors with a digital infrastructure – a platform, via which transactions they may or may not take part are carried out. This, again, makes it possible to establish a constant right the applicability of the rules relating to vertical restrictions to these infrastructure providers.

  It is also interesting to note that the court brings them closer to the legal obligations-in particular non-discrimination, weighing on them, weighing on internet access providers upstream and regulating their activities, practices of an operator like Google Located downstream, even in the absence of a legislative text. By replacing these operators in their vertical relationship, the parallel thus made a finalist and global assessment – no longer in silo – of the different operators structuring access by users to the Internet and its services.

  Such an approach as to the interweaving of the different strata of operators on the markets, makes it possible to reconcile by competition law and a combinatorial approach of technologies involved, an asymmetry of regulatory treatment deeply rooted in a sectoral approach which is is unsuitable for the transversality of positioning in the digital economy. This is again a great step forward, with constant law.

  Committed practices via Even essential infrastructure should not necessarily be analyzed in terms of jurisprudence relating to the refusal of supply

  If the case relates to the conditions for supplying by Google of its general research service via Access to the results pages of its search engine is not explicit access to access that is involved, but a differentiated treatment not objectively.

  While emphasizing the essential nature, irreplaceable in equivalent technical conditions of the Google search engine, which brings it closer to an essential facility, the court states that the terms of supply of content, products or services on this infrastructure should not necessarily being analyzed in terms of the criteria released by the case law relating to the refusals of supply in the case Brush of November 26, 1998 (PRE.)).

  The refusal of supply justifying the application of the criteria released by this judgment requires, on the one hand, an “express” character, namely the existence of a request or in any event of a wish to be granted Correlative access and refusal and, on the other hand, that the event generating the eviction effect lies mainly in refusal and not in an extrinsic practice as a form of abuse by lever effect. In the absence of such an express refusal, practices cannot be analyzed in terms of the criteria released by the judgment Brush, Even if they take similar eviction effects. Otherwise, all practices carrying eviction effects are likely to be akin to refusal of implicit access.

  After having circumscribed the scope of application of the criteria of case law Brush, The court describes in all their singularity the cases of difference in treatment in relation to the refusals of access. Lawyers General have indeed stressed in various conclusions that the application of the essential condition should be excluded in cases of discrimination by the dominant company between its competitors and its own operations downstream for example.

  In this case, the difference in treatment implemented by Google between its own comparator and competing comparators, far from being from an objective difference between two types of results on the Internet, resulted from a choice of Google and D ‘a treatment deemed discriminatory and not objectively justified. The attempts at justification put forward by Google as to the alleged improvement of the services have been ruled out, as not demonstrated and in any event inscription to counterbalance the anti -competitive effects. In this regard, the circumstance raised by Google that the practice had no anti -competitive objective is considered to be without surprise as ineffective.

  In this regard, it is more surprising than the judge has taken the opportunity to indicate that the demonstration of an anti -competitive object is only relevant in the context of offenses in article 101 of the TFUE relating to the agreements given the fundamentally character harmful to certain offenses. In the field of article 102 of the TFEU which applies to objective offenses, only the effects must be demonstrated, current or potential, even in a market related to that object of domination.

  Google’s withdrawal on its own services: abnormal, irrational and reverse behavior of the initial economic model with a universal vocation of its search engine

  Many developments are devoted by the court to the analysis of “normality” or “rationality” – these two concepts not being entirely soluble – of the behavior of Google and its positioning. The court in fact considers in a fairly surprising way the vocation of the generalist research site of Google in terms of its initial positioning. Thus returning to the universal vocation of Google’s search engine which consists in presenting all the possible results and content on the Google results pages, the court considers that behavior consisting in presenting specialized content, and in this case the his own, “has a certain form of abnormality” (pt 176).

  Insisting on this point, the court considers that the raison d’être and the value of its search engine resident in its ability to be open to results coming from outside, to third sources, and to display pluir sources. We get closer to the contours of the constitutional principle of pluralism of political and general information media, without however going as far as the recognition of such a concept in Community law. It is nevertheless in the light of this putting in perspective of the reason for the engine in an almost philosophical dimension that the court considers that there would be no rationality to restrict the sources of content, except in a Dominance situation where entry barriers are such that no risk of rapid entry is even made possible in short maturity in response to the limitation of consumers’ choice.

  The limiting behavior of Google therefore restricting consumers’ access to all of the possible results is considered by the Tribunal as the reverse of the economic model at the basis of the initial success of the Google search engine and thus assumed a form of abnormality. The court does not decide on the current economic model of Google or its search engine, emphasizing only the change in behavior which occurred and its irrationality. In doing so, the court seems to consider that the disputed practices would not have questioned the original model but illegally misguided it.

  It is by putting this change in perspective with the effect of increasing the visibility of its contents and the correlative degradation of the contents of the competitors that the court considers that the limitation “does not correspond to the expected object of ‘A general research service ”(pt 184). Google has indeed become “Superdominant”, then entered the market for comparison services. The superdominance of Google, coupled with its status as a gateway to the internet and very strong barriers at the entrance, requires, according to the court, a “reinforced obligation” not to undermine the operation of the competition (PT 183).